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BUSINESS RECORDS AND HOSPITAL RECORDS AS EXCEPTIONS
TO THE HEARSAY RULE
By STANLEY DUNN
The purpose of this comment is to review most of the cases in California
concerning the admissibility of business records and hospital records and
to note changes in those rules caused by the enactment of the Uniform Busi-
ness Records as Evidence Act, Code of Civil Procedure 1953 e-h in 1941.
This is done with the hope of shedding some light on the future interpretation
of that act more in accord with acceptance and reliance placed upon such
records by modern business.
In California prior to the enactment of the Uniform Business Records
as Evidence Act, the courts although recognizing the distinction between the
shop book exception* and the general course of business exception* made no
distinction in their requirements for admission with the possible exception
of a suppletory oath where the party kept his own books. (14 Cal. Law
Review 263; Kerns v. McKean, 76 Cal. 87, 18 P. 122.) Although the cases
are conflicting, the general rule was:
"In order to lay the foundation for the admission of books of account
as evidence, it must be shown that the books in question are books of account
kept in the regular course of business, that the business is of a character in
which it is proper or customary to keep such books, that the entries are
either original entries or the first permanent entries in the transaction, that
they were made at the time or within reasonable proximity to the time of
the respective transactions, and that the person making them had personal
knowledge of the transaction or obtained such knowledge from a report
regularly made to him by some other person employed in the business whose
duty it was to make the same in the regular course of business." (Chan Kiu
Sing v. Gordon, 171 Cal. 28, 151 P. 657; Burke v. John E. Marshall Inc.,
42 Cal. App. 2d 195, 108 P. 2d 738; Kains v. First Nat'l Bank, 30 Cal. App.
2d 447, 86 P. 2d 935; Warren v. Hiltscher, 111 Cal. App. 318, 295 P. 536;
Montgomery and Mullen Lumber Co. v. Ocean Park Scenic Ry. Co., 32 Cal.
App. 32, 161 P. 1171.
Prior to the Uniform Act, although the rule was not clearly established,
the entrant, if available, must have been present at the trial to lay the founda-
tion for the admission of the records so that the opposing party might have an
opportunity to cross-examine the witness as to the validity of the records.
(Butler v. Estrella Raisin Co., 124 Cal. 239, 56 P. 1040; In re Flint's Estate,
100 Cal. 391, 34 P. 863; White v. Whitney, 82 Cal. 163, 22 P. 1138; Kerns
v. McKean, 76 Cal. 87, 18 P. 122; Lusardi v. Prukop, 116 Cal. App. 506,
*The shop book exception allowed books of an individual proprietor to be admitted where he
was his own bookkeeper and he testified as to their correctness. The general course of business
exception admitted books as evidence where they were kept in the general course of business and
the entrant was unavailable.
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2 P.2c1 870.) But later cases have allowed their admission where the founda-
tion was laid either by a party under whose direction the entries were made,
although actually made by a subordinate, (Montgomery and Mullen Lumber
Co. v. Ocean Park Scenic Railway Co., 32 Cal. App. 32, 161 P. 1171) or
by the testimony of the bookkeeper which is allowed although the memoranda
from which he made the entries were supplied by other employees without
their being called or their absence explained. (Sugar Loaf Assn. v. Skewes,
47 Cal. App. 470, 190 P. 1076; Patrick v. Tetzlaff, 46 Cal. App. 243,
189 P. 115.) The cases have allowed the books to be introduced upon testi-
mony of a third person identifying the handwriting of the entrant where he
is unavailable. (Austin v. Wilcoxson (death), 149 Cal. 24, 84 P. 417; Sill
v. Reese (death), 47 Cal. 294; Warren v. Hiltscher (death), 111 Cal. App.
318, 295 P. 536; Cromer v. Strieby (mental illness), 54 Cal. App. 2d 405,
128 P. 2d 916; O'Neill v. O'Neill (death), 45 Cal. App. 772, 188 P. 603.)
Even though the entrant may be an incompetent witness such as in a survivor-
ship action (Code Civ. Proc. 1880-3), his testimony was receivable to estab-
lish, in part, a foundation for the books. (City Bank v. Enos, 135 Cal. 167,
67 P. 52; Cowdery v. McChesney, 124 Cal. 363, 57 P. 221; Roche v. Ware,
71 Cal. 375, 12 P. 284; Landis v. Turner, 14 Cal. 573.) Some cases have
prevented testimony as to the correctness of the books by the incompetent
witness, but otherwise allowed his testimony to lay the foundation. (Stuart
v. Lord, 138 Cal. 672, 72 P. 142; Colburn v. Parrett, 27 Cal. App. 541, 150
P. 786.) The fact that the books were those of a third party did not prevent
their admission. (Estate of Bell, 198 Cal. 32, 243 P. 423; Sill v. Reese, 47
Cal. 294; People v. Vacarella, 61 Cal. App. 119, 214 P. 237; contra: Wat-
rous v. Cunningham, 65 Cal. 410, 4 P. 408.)
Prior to the Uniform Act, most of the cases admitted the account books
as primary evidence. (White v. Whitney, 82 Cal. 163,22 P. 1138; Carroll v.
Storck, 57 Cal. 366; Caulfield v. Sanders, 17 Cal. 569; LeFranc v. Hewitt,
7 Cal. 186; Patrick v. Tetzlaff, 46 Cal. App. 243, 189 P. 115; Egan v.
Bishop, 8 Cal. App. 2d 119,47 P. 2d 500.) Other cases regarded such books
as secondary evidence admissible only as a necessity where no higher evi-
dence was obtainable. (Butler v. Estrella Raisin Co., 124 Cal. 239, 56 P.
1040; Kerns v. McKean, 76 Cal. 87, 18 P. 122; Severance v. Lombardo,
17 Cal. 57; Landis v. Turner, 14 Cal. 573.) In some cases they were inadmis-
sible except to refresh memory where primary evidence was obtainable,
(Treadwell v. Wells, 4 Cal. 260; People v. Blackman, 127 Cal. 248, 59 P.
573; In re Flint's Estate, 100 Cal. 391, 34 P. 863) or held admissible as
secondary and supplementary evidence only. (Cowdery v. McChesney, 124
Cal. 363, 57 P. 221; Bushnell v. Simpson, 119 Cal. 658, 51 P. 1080.)
The first permanent entries were admissible even though they were not
the original entries whether made from oral reports or written memoranda.
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(See M. Kanter Silk Co. v. Cramer, 136 Cal. App. 755, 30 P. 2d 53; Storm
and Butts v. Lipscomb, 117 Cal. App. 6, 3 P. 2d 567; Sugar Loaf Orange
Growers Ass'n v. Skewes, 47 Cal. App. 470, 190 P. 1076; Idol v. San Fran-
cisco Construction Co., 1 Cal. App. 92.) Patrick v. Tetzlaff, 46 Cal. App.
243, 189 P. 115, based its decision on Code of Civil Procedure 1947, "When
an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from
another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are equally
regarded as originals." However, San Francisco Teaming Co. v. Gray, 11 Cal.
App. 314, 104 P. 999, is contra in holding.
A few California cases required the party making the entry to have
personal knowledge of the transaction (see Butler v. Estrella Raisin Co., 124
Cal. 239, 56 P. 1040; Lusardi v. Prukop, 116 Cal. App. 506, 2 P. 2d 870;
Chandler v. Robinett, 21 Cal. App. 333, 131 P. 891; San Francisco Teaming
Co. v. Gray, 11 Cal. App. 314, 104 P. 999), but the greater majority of the
cases, recognizing the impossibility of this requirement in modern large
business associations, required only that the entrant obtain such knowledge
from a report of a person who had personal knowledge of the transaction.
(See Shields v. Rancho Buena Ventura, 187 Cal. 569, 203 P. 114; People v.
Tagawa, 39 Cal. App. 2d 548, 103 P. 2d 1024; Storm and Butts v. Lipscomb,
117 Cal. App. 6, 3 P. 2d 567; Patrick v. Tetzlaff, 46 Cal. App. 243, 189 P.
115.)
Entries to show cash payments or loans were inadmissible (see Collin v.
Card, 2 Cal. 421, Yick Wo v. Underhill, 5 Cal. App. 519, 90 P. 967; Dicta:
LeFranc v. Hewitt, 7 Cal. 186) with the possible exception of bank's records
and passbooks. (Blinn Lumber Co. v. McArthur, 150 Cal. 610, 89 P. 436;
City Bank v. Enos, 135 Cal. 167, 67 P. 52; Nicholson. v. Randall Banking
Co., 130 Cal. 533, 62 P. 930; Pauly v. Pauly, 107 Cal. 8, 40 P. 29; McLen-
non v. Bank of Calif., 87 Cal. 569,25 P. 760.)
Furthermore, it was necessary generally to show the correctness of the
books by other evidence before a proper foundation for their admission was
laid. (Watrous v. Cunningham, 71 Cal. 30, 11 P. 811; Kerns v. McKean,
76 Cal. 87, 18 P. 122; Kerns v. Dean, 77 Cal. 555, 19 P. 817). Colburn v.
Parrett, 27 Cal. App. 541, 150 P. 786, held: "This may be done by proof
of reputation that the party keeps honest books or by the testimony of anyone
who is able of his own knowledge to testify as to their correctness." The very
liberal (at the time) case of Patrick v. Tetzlaff, 46 Cal. App. 243, 189 P.
115, held no additional proof of correctness was necessary.
The Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act
The strictness of the above rules caused no hardship when applied to
small businesses and sole traderships, but with the growth of modern busi-
ness and their accounting practices, it is apparent that such requirements of
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personal knoweldge on the part of the entrant, and the requirement that if
available he must lay the foundation, etc., are impossible to apply to busi-
nesses employing thousands and whose accounting departments may number
hundreds. Further, under modern business practices, there is less likelihood
of falsification of the records due to the difficulty of doing so with a large
accounting department and the lack of motive because of the impersonal
relation to the books. Rather, the motive is to keep the books as accurate
as possible because of the rigors of supervision and the necessity of so compli-
cated a system. Thus, weighing the necessity against the chance of falsifica-
tion and the right of cross examination, along with the fact that modern busi-
nesses rely on such records daily, it became apparent that a profound change
in the above rules was needed. To accomplish this the Legislature adopted
the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, Stats. 1941, chapter 482,
section 1, now codified in the Code of Civil Procedure, section 1953 (e)
through (h):
(e) "The term business as used in this article shall include every kind
of business, profession, occupation, calling, or operation of institutions
whether carried on for profit or not.
(f) "A record of an act, condition, or event, shall, in so far as relevant,
be competent evidence if the custodian or other qualified witness testifies as
to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the
regular course of business, at or near the time of the act, condition or event,
and if, in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method, and
time of preparation were such as to justify its admission.
(g) "This article shall be so construed and interpreted as to effectuate
its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
(h) "This article may be cited as the Uniform Business Records as
Evidence Act."
The following types of records have been admitted in California under
the Uniform Act: Corporation's books of account, People v. Jones, 61 Cal.
App. 2d 608, 143 P. 2d 726; oil pumpers daily gauge book, shipping book,
bundles of crude oil invoices, Doyle v. Chief Oil Co., 64 Cal. App. 2d 284,
148 P. 2d 915; U. S. Navy official medical discharge, Gunter v. Claggett,
65 Cal. App. 2d 636, 151 P. 2d 271; creditor's records in an action by guar-
antee against debtor, Barth v. Adelstein, 66 Cal. App. 2d 406, 152 P. 2d 498;
time card, People v. Richardson, 74 Cal. App. 2d 528, 169 P. 2d 44; laundry
receipt tags, Oakland, Calif., Towel Co. v. Zanes, 81 Cal. App. 2d 343,
184 P. 2d 21; business letters, Holder v. Key System, 88 Cal. App. 2d 925,
200 P. 2d 98; affidavit of notice of service of process, DeHart v. Allen,
26 Cal. 2d 829, 161 P. 2d 453; tomato inspection certificates, 12 A. G. 103.
As to hospital records, the Supreme Court of California has held:
"They are as truthful and reliable as those of any commercial firm," and
are admissible for all purposes. (Loper v. Morrison (leading case), 23 Cal.
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2d 600, 145 P. 2d 1; People v. McGee (time and manner of operation),
31 Cal. 2d 229, 187 P. 2d 706; McDowd v. Pig'n Whistle Co. (diagnosis,
extent of injury), 26 Cal. 2d 696, 160 P. 2d 797; People v. Powell, 90 A. C. A.
228, 202 P. 2d 837; In re Powers Estate '(mental confusion and irration-
ality), 81 Cal. App. 2d 480, 184 P. 2d 319; People v. Biornsen, 79 Cal. App.
2d 519, 180 P. 2d 443; Carney v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures (cause of death),
78 Cal. App. 2d 659, 178 P. 2d 482; Ducat v. Goldner (hospital charges),
77 Cal. App. 2d 332, 175 P. 2d 914; (see, also, 14 Southern Cal. Law Review
99, 18 Southern Cal. Law Review 60).)
But newspaper clippings, a letter and a telegram giving cause of death
were inadmissible as hearsay and not within the business records as evidence
exception. (Bebbington v. Calif. West States Life Ins. Co., 30 Cal. 2d 157,
180 P. 2d 673.) Statements as to what the records contain rather than the
records themselves have likewise been excluded as hearsay. (Bebbington v.
Calif. West States Life Ins. Co., supra; Fuller v. White, 85 A. C. A. 508,
193 P. 2d 100, 33 Cal. 2d 236, 201 P. 2d 16.) In the Bebbington case, above,
a death certificate was held admissible to show the cause of death only and
not the circumstances surrounding it.
Foundation Under The Uniform Act
"As worded the act renders it unnecessary to call the various employees
in the business or account for their absence. The records may be adequately
verified by the custodian or other qualified witness. This is a point of
departure from precedent. 'Qualified' as used in the act'probably was intended
to mean only that the witness was sufficiently acquainted with the books to
identify them and to testify as to the routine of the business in the matter of
making its records." (Doyle v. Chief Oil Co., 64 Cal. App. 2d 284, 148 P. 2d
915; see, also, 12 A. G. 103.)
"The object of the business records statute is to eliminate the necessity
of calling each witness and to substitute the record of the transaction."
(Loper v. Morrison, 23 Cal. 2d 600, 145 P. 2d 1; McDowd v. Pig'n Whistle
Corp., 26 Cal. 2d 696, 160 P. 2d 797; People v. Powell, 90 A. C. A. 228,
202 P. 2d 837; Thompson v. Machado, 78 Cal. App. 2d 870, 178 P. 2d 838;
see, also, 12 A. G. 103, 17 Southern Cal. Law Review 409, 18 Southern Cal.
Law Review 60.)
"It is unnecessary that the person making the entry have personal knowl-
edge of the transaction." (Loper v. Morrison, supra; People v. Powell, supra;
Thompson v. Machado, supra.)
"But the witness must identify the records and testify to the mode of
their preparation, his custodianship, and time of preparation." (Fuller v.
White, 85 A. C. A. 508, 193 P. 2d 100; Luthringer v. Moore, 31 Cal. 2d 489,
190 P. 2d 1; McDowd v. Pig'n Whistle Co., supra; Thompson v. Machado,
supra; Carney v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, 78 Cal. App. 2d 659, 178 P. 2d 482;
Brown v. Los Angeles Co., 77 Cal. App. 2d 814, 176 P. 2d 753; Ducat v.
Goldner, 77 Cal. App. 2d 332, 175 P. 2d 914; People v. Richardson, 74 Cal.
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App. 2d 528, 169 P. 2d 44; Doyle v. Chief Oil Co., 64 Cal. App. 2d 248,
148 P. 2d 915; 35 California Law Review 434.)
The records must have been made in the regular course of business at or
near the time of the act, condition, or event. (Code Civ. Proc. 1953 F;
McDowd v. Pig'n Whistle Co., supra; People v. Powell, supra; Brown v. Los
Angeles Co., supra; Ducat v. Goldner, supra; People v. Richardson, supra;
Doyle v. Chief Oil Co., supra; Fuller v. White, supra.)
However, Robinson v. Puls, 72 A. C. A. 314, 164 P. 2d 332 (Cal. App.),
28 Cal. 2d 664, 171 P. 2d 430, held (Justice Traynor, dissenting) that "where
the person who makes the entry is dead, evidence that the books were in his
handwriting and kept correctly is sufficient foundation, the statutory presump-
tion that a 'writing is truly dated', Code of Civil Procedure 1963-23, and that
the 'ordinary course of business has been followed', Code of Civil Procedure
1963-20, obviating the necessity for any additional showing as to the con-
temporaneous nature of the entry." This holding has been criticized. See
35 Cal. Law Review 434, 19 Southern Cal. Law Review 454.
The Uniform Act places the admission of such evidence within the
discretion of the trial court, "if in its opinion the sources of information,
method, and time of preparation were such as to justify its admission." In
an action on a book account individual sheets not bound together in perma-
nent form were excluded since "they were not accorded the presumption
of accuracy and reliability of bound books. Such records fail to establish
a book account." (Tabata v. Murane, 76 Cal. App. 2d 887, 174 P. 2d 684.)
But compare Oakland, Calif. Towel Co. v. Zanes, 81 Cal. App. 2d 343,
184 P. 2d 21, which allowed individual receipt tags as evidence distinguish-
ing the Tabata case on the ground that this was not a suit on a book account;
Thompson v. Machado, 78 Cal. App. 2d 870, 178 P. 2d 838, which allowed
Burroughs Accounting System individual ledger sheets; and Doyle v. Chief
Oil Co., 64 Cal. App. 2d 284, 148 P. 2d 915, which allowed individual
invoices. The determination that the foundation is sufficient is binding on
the appellate court in the absence of abuse of the trial court's discretion.
(Ducat v. Goldner, 77 Cal. App. 2d 332, 175 P. 2d 914; Thompson v.
Machado, 78 Cal. App. 2d 870, 178 P. 2d 838; Tabata v. Murane, supra.)
However, "before an account is admissible on an open book account, it must
be shown to have been accurately kept and so complete as to show the balance
of indebtedness," (Tabata v. Murane, supra), "but the fact parol evidence
is necessary to explain ambiguities will not prevent its admissibility."
(Robinson v. Puls, 72 A. C. A. 314, 164 P. 2d 332.) Such records are also
admissible where relevant to litigation between third parties. (Doyle v. Chief
Oil Co., supra.) Such books and records are considered to be prima facie
evidence since it is presumed that the regular course of business has been
followed, Code of Civil Procedure 1963, and that the books and records truly
reflect the facts set forth in such books, but the degree of credit to be given
them is for the jury. (Ducat v. Goldner, supra; People v. Caldwell, 55 Cal.
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App. 2d 238, 254 P. 2d 495; Thompson v. Machado, supra; Arques v. Nat'l
Superior Co., 67 Cal. App. 2d 763, 155 P. 2d 643.)
The California Supreme Court in construing the act has stated:
"The purpose of the act is to enlarge the operation of the business records
exception to the hearsay rule. The common law exception is based upon the
assumption that records kept in the general course of business usually are
accurate and may be used in case of necessity as evidence of the matter
recorded. The act should be liberally interpreted so as to do away with the
anachronistic rules which give rise to its need and at which it was- aimed."
(Loper v. Morrison, 23 Cal. 2d 600, 145 P. 2d 1.)
Other Problems
Although the statute has to some extent altered the previous rules as to
original records, personal knowledge, availability of entrant, cash entries,
etc., a few of the cases decided prior to the act may still be in point. Thus
the requirement of contemporaneousness of the recordation to the transaction
in order to insure its trustworthiness is continued under the act, and the case
of Landis v. Turner, 14 Cal. 573, holding that a lapse of three days in trans-
ferring memoranda to the books is not so unreasonable as to make the book
inadmissible. Similarly, under the requirement that the records must be
made in the regular course of business would make such cases as Brown v.
Ball, 123 Cal. App. 758, 12 P. 2d 28, excluding corporation's books kept
by a committee of creditors and Yick Wo v. Underhill, 5 Cal. App. 519,
90 P. 967, excluding restaurant books showing loans not made in the regular
course of business but otherwise allowing them for other entries applicable.
Both prior to and under the act, the entries to be admissible must be
the proper subject of such a book account; allowed-baptismal records to
prove contested heirship, In re Bell's Estate, 198 Cal. 32, 243 P. 423;
excluded-corporation's books of account showing trust relationship where
such books were not the proper place to record such, Fletcher v. Kidder,
163 Cal. 769, 127 P. 73; allowed-a sheriff's book showing receipt of writs
of attachment, date of return, etc., Hesser v. Rowley, 1.39 Cal. 410, 73 P.
156; excluded-"poker book" of gambling debts as not a tradesman's book,
Frank v. Pennie, 117 Cal. 254, 49 P. 208; excluded-pay roll records of an
association in the nature of a hiring hall for stevedores as not properly or
customarily kept by such associations, Burke v. John E. Marshall Inc., 42 Cal.
App. 2d 195, 108 P. 2d 738; excluded-entry in attorney's books of a con-
tingent fee agreement as having no proper place in an account book, Batch-
eller v. Whittier, 12 Cal. App. 262, 107 P. 141; excluded-restaurant books
to establish loans not connected with the business, Yick Wo v. Underhill,
5 Cal. App. 519, 90 P. 967; excluded-on grounds that the record was a
private account book or private memorandum only, Ensign v. So. Pac. Co.,
193 Cal. 311,223 P. 953; Thompson v. Orena, 134 Cal. 26, 66 P. 24; Collin
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v. Card, 2 Cal. 421; Crezghton v. Creighton, 6 Cal. App. 2d 270, 43 P. 2d
1104; (seemingly contra, Mullenary v. Burton, 3 Cal. App. 263, 84 P. 159).
"The book must specifically connect and refer to the other party in the
transaction" (Roger v. Graves, 1 Cal. Unrep. Cases 21), and there must be
direct dealings between the parties. (Seierance v. Lombardo, 17 Cal. 57;
Overland v. Davis, 50 Cal. App. 2d 507, 123 P. 2d 581.)
"The law does not prescribe any standard of bookkeeping practice which
all must follow regardless of the nature of the business." An attorney's court
docket and journal was allowed as evidence although he kept no ledger.
(Egan v. Bishop, 8 Cal. App. 2d 119, 47 P. 2d 500.) But the records must
be certain as to accounts, parties, and amounts and contain all the dealings
between the parties. (Chandler v. Robznett, 21 Cal. App. 333, 131 P. 891;
Tipps v. Landers, 182 Cal. 771, 190 P. 173.) However, they may be allowed
although entered in a fictitious name (Rodehaver v. Mankel, 16 Cal. App. 2d
597, 61 P. 2d 61) and in a foreign language (Chan Kiu Sing v. Gordon,
171 Cal. 28, 151 P. 657.)
Evidence of falsification or alteration of the books will make them
inadmissible unless such changes are shown to have been properly made or
not to have affected the account. (See People v. Blackman, 127 Cal. 248,
59 P. 573; Webster v. San Pedro Lumber Co., 101 Cal. 326, 35 P. 871;
LeFranc v. Hewitt, 7 Cal. 186; Schneider v. Oakman Mining Co., 38 Cal.
App. 338, 176 P. 177.) Caldwell v. McDermit, 17 Cal. 464, held it was
proper to exclude the books where the only explanation of the alterations
was the testimony of the party himself, while Butler v. Beech, 55 Cal. 28,
admitted the books although altered by the plaintiff where there was expert
testimony as to their correctness. However, even though the account in ques-
tion is not affected by alterations and falsifications, evidence of such altera-
tions and falsifications in other accounts is admissible to assail the general
character of the books and discredit the entries admitted. (People v. Fair-
field, 90 Cal. 186,27 P. 199.)
Whether books are admissible to show lack of an entry as evidence of
the non-occurrence of the act, event, or transaction is in doubt in California.
The cases are in-hopeless conflict. No cases have been decided since the
passage of the Uniform Act and it itself throws no light on the problem.
Admitting the books for such a purpose are: Austin v. Wilcoxson, 149 Cal.
24, 84 P. 417; Cowdery v. McChesney, 124 Cal. 363, 57 P. 221; People v.
Fairfield, 90 Cal. 186, 27 P. 199; Ford v. Cunningham, 87 Cal. 209, 25 P.
403; Dyer v. Minturn, 47 Cal. App. 1, 189 P. 1046. Excluding such books:
Kerns v. Dean, 77 Cal. 555, 19 P. 817; Kerns v. McKean, 76 Cal. 87, 18 P.
122; Lewis v. McNeal, 58 Cal. App. 70, 207 P. 1021. That Code of Civil
Procedure, 1953, e-h, should be construed to admit the books for this purpose,
see W. G. Hale in 15 Southern California Law Review 37.
